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Abstract

By the late 1990s fertility in the developed world had declined to 1.6 births
per woman, a level substantially lower than projected in the 1980s. This study examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed world with particular
emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the timing of childbearing.
The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in these countries is indeed
low, women’s childbearing levels are not as low as period measures such as the total
fertility rate suggest. To obtain a full understanding of the various dimensions of
fertility change, several indicators are examined, including period and cohort fertility by birth order and childbearing preferences. An analysis of these indicators demonstrates that period fertility measures in many developed countries are temporarily
depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing. The distortion of the TFR is as
great as 0.4 birth per woman in Italy and Spain. These effects have been present in
many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the
future. But tempo effects are temporary in nature and once the postponement of
childbearing ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility-depressing effect stops, thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. Countries with very low
fertility and substantial tempo effects may well experience modest rises in fertility
in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems highly unlikely that fertility will rebound to the replacement level.

This material may not be reproduced without written permission from the author.

Over the past quarter-century massive changes in fertility behavior have occurred
in most world regions. Many developing countries have experienced large and rapid
fertility declines, and a number of countries in Asia and Latin America are now approaching the end of their transitions with fertility around or in a few cases (e.g., China)
even below 2 births per woman. In the “more developed” world (Europe, North America,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) average period fertility was already low in the early
1950s and has decreased further to 1.6 births per woman in the late 1990s (United Nations 2001).
These recent fertility declines have been more rapid and pervasive than was
prevously expected. For example, medium variant projections for the late 1990s
prepared by the United Nations Population Division in the 1970s, 1980s, and early
1990s slightly overestimated the fertility levels observed in the 1990s for the world
and many regions. This outcome is primarily attributable to the past assumption that
all countries end their fertility transitions with fertility stabilizing at the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. This assumption was widely accepted in the
past and it is fair to say that the UN incorporated the consensus of the demographic
community on this issue. Starting with its 1998 revision the UN no longer takes 2.1
as the eventual end point of the transition, and countries with low fertility are now
projected to remain permanently below the replacement level (United Nations 1999,
2001; United Nations Population Division 2000a).
One reason for this uncertainty about future fertility trends is that conventional demographic theory has had little to say about levels and trends in post-transitional societies (Caldwell 1982). In an attempt to remedy this shortcoming, demographers and social scientists are engaged in an active debate on the causes of
low fertility and the prospects for further change (Chenais 1996, 1998; Lesthaeghe
2001; Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; McDonald 2000). The matter is of considerable importance because further declines in fertility or even a continuation of current low fertility levels will contribute to rapid aging of populations and will lead to
decline in the size of national populations. These demographic developments in turn
are likely to have significant social and economic consequences (Coale 1986; OECD
1998; World Bank 1994).

This study examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed
world with particular emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the
timing of childbearing. The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in
these countries is indeed low, women’s childbearing levels are not as low as period
measures such as the total fertility rate suggest. This argument has been advanced in
earlier research based on theoretical analysis (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). The
present study extends this earlier work with more extensive empirical evidence. The
implications for future trends in fertility are discussed in the last section.
F ERTILITY L EVELS AND T RENDS
To obtain a fuller understanding of the various dimensions of fertility change
several indicators will be examined, starting with period fertility.
Period fertility
Overviews of recent fertility trends in the developed world are widely available
(Calot 1999; Coleman 1996; Council of Europe 2000; Demeny 1997; Sardon 2000;
United Nations Population Division 2000b); only a brief summary will be provided here
based on estimates from United Nations (2001). In general, fertility as measured by the
total fertility rate (TFR) was well above the replacement level in the 1950s and early
1960s, averaging 2.8 births per woman. In most countries, this period was followed by
one of sharp decline to below-replacement level (to 1.91 on average) between the mid1960s and late 1970s. Over the past two decades fertility decline has continued but at a
much slower pace, and in a few countries fertility has turned up slightly—for example,
in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and the United States. In the four decades from the late
1950s to the late 1990s the TFR of the developed world dropped by 44 percent, from
2.82 to 1.57 births per woman, with more than two-thirds of this decline occurring before the late 1970s.
These average trends conceal much variation among regions and countries. In the
late 1990s the highest total fertility rates were observed in North America (2.00), Australia/New Zealand (1.80), and Northern Europe (1.67) and the lowest in Japan (1.41),
Southern Europe (1.32), and Eastern Europe (1.28). The TFRs of particular developed
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countries are as low as 1.2 in Italy, Russia, and Spain while TFRs of 2 births per woman
are found in the US and New Zealand. Although the focus of this analysis is on the
“more developed” world (as defined by the UN), it is worth noting that period fertility
has also dropped below the replacement level in several Asian countries where socioeconomic development has been rapid (e.g., in Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea). 1
Cohort fertility
The fertility of a cohort of women born in the same year is usually measured by
the completed fertility rate (CFR), which equals the average number of births per woman
at the end of the childbearing years. Trends in the CFR of successive cohorts have generally followed the downward trend in period fertility (Frejka and Calot 2001). A substantive drawback of cohort measures such as the CFR is that they are primarily affected
by childbearing levels in the past. Peak childbearing years occur typically two or three
decades before the end of the reproductive years, when the women whose completed
fertility is being measured were in their 20s and early 30s. The fact that the CFR does
not provide useful information on recent trends in fertility is the main reason cohort
measures are not widely used. However, the CFR does have the considerable advantage
of being an unambiguous and real measure of fertility, while the more up-to-date TFR is
a hypothetical measure that is subject to bias and hence potential misinterpretation, as
will be demonstrated below.
Comparisons of period and cohort fertility are complicated by the fact that childbearing of a cohort is spread out over a range of ages and years. Nevertheless, one can
make useful comparisons of completed cohort fertility with the average TFR prevailing
during the years in which the cohort was in its prime childbearing years. Table 1 presents the completed fertility rate for the 1960 cohort and the average total fertility rate
for 1980–94 when this cohort was between the ages of 20 and 35. The 1960 cohort was
chosen for this exercise because it had reached age 40 by the year 2000. Although this
cohort has not yet completed its childbearing, its future fertility is likely to be modest
and can be projected with considerable confidence (Council of Europe 2000). Table 1
includes the developed countries for which the relevant data were available from the
sources indicated. In this group of countries the average TFR for 1980–94 ranged from
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Table 1 Completed fertility rate (1960 cohort) and estimates of the total fertility rate
(average for 1980–94) for developed countries

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Macedonia
United Kingdom
United States

Completed fertility
1960 cohort
2.12
1.69
1.84
1.95
2.02
1.89
1.99
1.95
2.10
1.65
1.93
2.02
2.49
2.41
1.65
1.84
1.75
1.85
2.34
2.09
2.18
1.90
2.16
1.83
2.17
1.87
1.75
2.04
1.77
2.29
1.96
2.02

Total fertility rate
1980–94
1.89
1.51
1.59
1.85
1.89
1.57
1.99
1.72
1.80
1.41
1.64
1.81
2.18
2.40
1.38
1.65
1.53
1.55
2.02
1.78
2.15
1.75
2.05
1.89
2.12
1.64
1.58
1.85
1.54
2.25
1.80
1.88

Difference
0.23
0.18
0.25
0.10
0.13
0.32
0.00
0.23
0.30
0.24
0.29
0.21
0.31
0.01
0.27
0.19
0.22
0.30
0.32
0.31
0.03
0.15
0.11
–0.06
0.05
0.23
0.17
0.19
0.23
0.04
0.16
0.14

Note: TFR estimates for Australia and New Zealand are from United Natinos 2001 and refer to the
period from mid-1980 to mid-1995.
Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sardon 2000; Sato 2001; United Nations 2001.

a low of 1.38 in Italy to a high of 2.40 in Ireland, and the CFR ranged from 1.65 to 2.41
in the same two countries. There is a strong correlation between the CFR and TFR
(r=0.94). A key finding from this comparison of cohort and period fertility is that in all
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but one of these countries (Russia) the CFR of the 1960 cohort exceeds (or in one case
equals) the average TFR for the period 1980–94. This difference averages 0.2 births per
woman for the set of 32 countries in Table 1.
Some analysts have argued that if period fertility remains significantly below the
replacement level of 2.1 births for a long time, then the fertility of the cohorts who did
their childbearing during these years cannot reach replacement fertility. This conclusion
is not correct as is evident, for example, from the data for France. The TFR in France has
been below 2 since the early 1970s and the average TFR for 1980–94 was 1.80. Despite
this low period fertility, the 1960 cohort is expected to have 2.1 children. A similar
pattern is observed in Australia, Norway, and Sweden. The reasons for these differences
between cohort and period fertility will be explored further in a later section.
Birth-order components of fertility
The birth-order components of cohort or period measures of fertility are the parts
of these measures that are attributable to births of given orders. For example, the firstorder component of completed cohort fertility (CFR1) is simply the average number of
first births born per woman, which equals the proportion of the cohort that has had a first
birth during their lives; the second-order component (CFR2) is the average number of
second births born per woman, which equals the proportion that has had a second birth,
and so forth. The sum of these components equals the CFR. None of the birth-order
components exceeds one, because women can have no more than one birth of any order,
and the components decline in size as order rises, because no woman can have a birth of
a given order without also having had a birth of the preceding order.2 Similar components can be calculated for the TFR. For example, the component for births of order 1
(TFR1) equals the average number of first births women would have by age 50 if they
were to bear first births at the age-specific rates observed in a given year or period.3
Throughout the present analysis order refers to the biological birth order of the mother,
and data from countries recording births by order within current marriage are therefore
not used. Figure 1 illustrates the birth-order decomposition for cohort and period fertility in Japan (Sato 2001). The 1960 cohort on average had 1.84 children, which is the
sum of 0.84 births of order 1, 0.70 of order 2, 0.26 of order 3, and 0.05 of order 4 or
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higher. Similarly, the total fertility rate for 1980–94 was 1.65 births per woman, which is the
sum of 0.73 births of order 1, 0.64 of order 2, 0.24 of order 3 and 0.04 of order 4 or higher.
The first-order component of cohort fertility (CFR1) is of special interest because,
by subtracting it from 1.0, one obtains the proportion childless among women in the
cohort. For example, the CFR1 for the 1960 cohort in Japan equals 0.84, which means
that 16 percent of these women are childless. Figure 2 plots estimates of the CFR1 for
the 1960 cohort for 17 countries for which these data are available. The CFR1 ranges in
size from 0.97 in Bulgaria to 0.82 in Italy, indicating levels of childlessness of 3 percent
in the former country and 18 percent in the latter.
A comparison of these cohort results with the first-order component of period
fertility (CFR1 for the 1960 cohort and TFR1 for 1980–89, respectively4) in the same
countries reveals substantial differences (see Figure 2). Specifically, the period-based
estimates suggest, implausibly, that childlessness is much more common than the level

Figure 1 Completed fertility (1960 cohort) and total fertility rate
(1980–94), Japan
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calculated for cohorts in most of these countries. An explanation for the unexpectedly
small sizes of these first-order components of period fertility will be given shortly.
Timing of childbearing
The most widely used indicator of timing is the mean age at childbearing (MAC).
The MAC can be measured either for cohorts or for specific periods, but the focus here
is on period measures of timing. In European countries the MAC for 1995 was typically
in the late 20s, ranging from 24.3 years in Bulgaria to 30.2 years in Ireland and the
Netherlands (Council of Europe 2000). Similar averages are obtained in Japan (29.4)
and the United States (26.8) (Sato 2001; Ventura et al. 1997).
Changes over time in the mean age at childbearing are the result of two demographic factors. The first is the decline in higher-order births that occurs as societies
move through their fertility transitions. Fertility declines are observed at all orders but
they are usually far larger at higher than at lower orders. In other words, in contemporary societies with fertility around 2 births per women, most women have at least one
birth as was the case historically, but the number of third and higher-order births is much
smaller than in the past. As a result, the mean age at childbearing declines even if there
is no change in the timing of births of each order. The second factor is the change in the
timing of births of specific orders. The net effect of these two factors varies among
societies. In many contemporary developing countries the decline in higher-order births
is occurring more rapidly than the rise in the timing of individual births, so that the mean
age at childbearing is declining (Bongaarts 1999a). In contrast, in most contemporary
industrialized countries the rise in the mean age at first and higher-order births is occurring so rapidly that their effect exceeds any birth-order composition effect. The mean
age at childbearing has therefore risen over the past two decades in most developed
countries (Council of Europe 2000).
For present purposes the trend in the mean age at first births (MAC1) is of special
interest, because it is the key factor determining trends in higher birth orders. Figure 3
plots trends in MAC1 for a number of large developed countries. In each of these the
mean age at first birth has risen sharply since the mid-1970s. During the 1980s increases
exceeding 1 year per decade were observed in many European countries including France,
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Figure 3 Mean age of women at first birth in selected industrialized countries
29
28

Age (years)

27
26

Japan

25

Italy
France

24
Germany

23
United States

22
1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sato 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.

Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom as well as in Japan and the United States. This
upward trend continues unabated in the 1990s in most countries, although in the United
States the MAC1 leveled off briefly around 1990.
Fertility preferences
Evidence on women’s childbearing intentions and a comparison of these intentions with actual fertility can shed light on current childbearing behavior. Table 2 presents the average number of children ultimately wanted by women aged 30–34 for 15
countries participating in the Fertility and Family Surveys project undertaken in the
ECE region (including the US and Canada) in the early 1990s. This preference indicator
is obtained by adding the number of children a survey respondent already has to the
additional number wanted over the remainder of her reproductive years. Average ultimate wanted family size for these women is quite similar in this group of countries,
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Table 2 Number of children ultimately wanted by women aged 30–34 and
completed fertility rate of the 1960 cohort

Austria 1996
Belgium 1991–92
Finland 1992
France 1994
Germany 1992
Hungary 1992–93
Italy 1995–96
Netherlands 1993
Norway 1988–89
Poland 1991
Portugal 1997
Spain 1994–95
Sweden 1992–93
Switzerland 1994–95
United States 1995

Number of
children wanted
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.0
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.1
2.2
2.5
2.2
2.3

Completed fertility
1960 cohort
1.69
1.84
1.95
2.10
1.65
2.02
1.65
1.85
2.09
2.18
1.90
1.75
2.04
1.77
2.02

Sources: For number of children wanted: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (various
years); US DHHS 1997. For completed fertility see Table 1.

ranging from 2.0 children per woman in Austria and Germany to 2.5 in Sweden. There is
little variation between preferences of women in the 30–34 age group and women of
other age groups. Changes in preferences from successive surveys are not available for
most of these countries. Exceptions include the US and the Netherlands where preferences have been virtually stable since the 1970s (Peterson 1995; De Graaf 1995).
The preferences for age group 30–34 were selected for inclusion in Table 2 because this age group represents cohorts born around 1960 (the surveys were mostly
conducted in the early 1990s). These preferences can be compared with the CFR for the
1960 cohort to determine the level of preference implementation. In an ideal world women
would bear the number of children they want, but this clearly is not the case in contemporary developed countries. A comparison of wanted number of children with the completed fertility estimates from Table 1 shows that actual cohort fertility falls well short
of women’s preferences. The shortfall averages 0.3 births per woman in this set of countries. The reasons for this shortfall are not obvious, but they are likely to include competing preferences for a career, marital disruption, celibacy, and infecundity. This find-
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ing suggests that efforts to help women overcome the various obstacles to the implementation of their preferences would lead to higher fertility, with cohort fertility at least
potentially not far below the replacement level.
D ISTORTIONS OF P ERIOD F ERTILITY M EASURES
The preceding discussion summarized recent levels and trends in period and cohort fertility, their birth-order components, and their timing. We next examine the interrelations among these measures.
Empirical evidence of tempo distortions
Demographers have long known that changes in the timing of childbearing affect
the relationship between cohort and period fertility. Norman Ryder (1956, 1964, 1980,
1983) has written a series of influential articles on this subject. He demonstrated that
period fertility is lower than cohort fertility when the mean age at childbearing rises and
the reverse is true when the mean age at childbearing declines. In effect, when successive cohorts delay childbearing their births are spread out over a larger number of years
than would be the case if the timing were constant; the result is a reduction in period
fertility. Conversely, when successive cohorts are advancing their childbearing, their
births accumulate more rapidly in periods, thus inflating period fertility relative to cohort fertility. These effects are sizable: one year’s worth of births is lost/gained for every
one year rise/decline in the timing of childbearing during a specific interval of time. The
difference between period and cohort fertility caused by changes in the timing of births
is called the tempo or timing effect. This tempo effect may be considered a distortion because it changes the TFR in ways that most analysts are either not aware of or wish to avoid.
The existence of timing distortions is readily documented when the age at childbearing is declining rapidly. In that case, implausible results are usually obtained for
birth-order components of the TFR. For example, as shown in Figure 4, in most years
during the 1950s TFR1 in the US exceeded 1.0, which suggests that women had more
than one first birth on average. This is impossible and these TFR1 estimates must therefore be reinterpreted. The main reason why TFR1 is higher than 1.0 during many baby
boom years is that the age at childbearing declined, with the MAC1 changing from 23.3
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Figure 4 Total fertility rate for birth-order 1 and mean age of women at first birth,
United States, 1950–60
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Source: Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.

years in 1950 to 22.4 years in 1960. This decline resulted in a temporary inflation of
TFR1. The size of this tempo distortion at birth-order 1 can be estimated as the difference between the average TFR1 in the 1950s and the CFR1 of the 1930 cohort, which had
most of its first births during the 1950s. The average tempo distortion was positive and
equal to 0.10 births (or 11 percent) in the US during the 1950s, because the average
observed TFR1 was 1.00 and the CFR1 for the 1930 cohort was 0.90.
A negative tempo effect is more difficult to document, because an examination of
observed birth-order components of the TFR does not usually produce obvious inconsistencies. However, a persuasive case for such an effect can be made in a number of
contemporary countries. For example, as shown in Figure 5, the average TFR1 during
the 1980s in Denmark was 0.68. If taken at face value this estimate implies that 32
percent of women were childless. This is clearly an unrealistic estimate, because the
actual level of childlessness for the 1960 cohort (which had most of its first births in the
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Figure 5 Total fertility rate for birth-order 1 and mean age of women at first birth,
Denmark, 1980–90
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Source: Council of Europe 2000; Sardon 2001.

1980s) is 12 percent and its CFR1 equals 0.88 (Sardon 2001). In this case, the TFR1
contains a downward distortion because the mean age at first birth rose by 1.9 years
from 24.5 to 26.4 years during the 1980s. The size of this tempo distortion is –0.20
births per woman, or 23 percent below the cohort level.
These comparisons of the fertility of the 1960 cohort and period fertility during
the 1980s for birth-order 1, and the relationship of their difference to the timing of first
births have been repeated for 18 populations. Key results from this exercise are summarized in Figure 6. The horizontal axis plots the change in the mean age at first births
during the 1980s (i.e., MAC1 in 1990 minus MAC1 in 1980) and the vertical axis plots
the tempo effect measured as the percentage difference between the CFR1 of the 1960
cohort and the average TFR1 during the 1980s.5 Each point in this figure represents one
country. For example, Denmark, the country with the largest negative distortion during
the 1980s, had a –23 percent distortion and a 1.9-year increase in MAC1. In contrast, the
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Figure 6 Relationship between the tempo effect (percent) at birth-order 1 and the increase
in mean age of women at first birth, selected countries, 1980–90, and United States, 1950–60
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Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sardon 2000, 2001; Sato 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.

United States during the 1950s experienced an upward distortion of 11 percent because
the MAC1 declined by 0.9 years. In general, the preceding analysis indicates that the
tempo effect should be 0 when MAC1 is constant, it should be negative when MAC1
rises, and it should be positive when MAC1 declines. The results presented in Figure 6
confirm these expectations: the tempo effect is strongly and inversely associated with
the change in the mean age during the 1980s (R2=0.95) This finding provides clear
support for the existence of tempo distortions of period fertility.
Theoretical estimates of tempo effects
Up to this point only empirical evidence for a tempo effect has been examined.
We next discuss the magnitude of the tempo effect expected on theoretical grounds and
then compare the two approaches.
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In a recent study, Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) propose a procedure for removing tempo effects from the total fertility rate. They demonstrate that (provided fertility is
affected only by period effects6), the observed total fertility rate in any given year is
related to the total fertility rate that would have been observed in the absence of tempo
effects as
TFRo= (1–mo)TFR’o.

(1)

In this equation TFRo is the observed total fertility rate component for birth-order
o, TFR’o is the tempo-free total fertility rate component for birth-order o, and mo is the
annual change in the mean age of the age-specific fertility schedule for birth-order o
during the year the TFR is observed. Multiplying the tempo-free TFR’o by the distortion
component (1 – mo) yields the observed TFRo. For example, according to equation (1),
an annual increase of one-tenth of one year in the mean age at childbearing (mo = 0.1)
reduces the TFRo by 10 percent below its tempo-free level, because in that case TFRo =
0.9TFR’o . Similarly, an annual decline in the mean age at a rate of just 0.1 years per year
(mo = –0.1) inflates the TFRo by 10 percent. Apparently, rather modest changes in the
timing of childbearing at any birth order can produce substantial changes in observed
fertility. These tempo effects operate instantaneously, that is, a change up or down in the
timing of childbearing from one year to the next as measured by mo results in simultaneous changes in the TFR relative to the tempo-free TFR.
In practice, the TFRo is observed and the unobserved tempo-adjusted fertility can
be estimated from
TFR’o = TFRo /(1–mo).

(2)

By dividing the observed total fertility rate by (1 – mo) at any given birth-order o,
one obtains an estimate of the total fertility rate that would have been observed had there
been no change in the timing of childbearing. Applying this equation separately to all
birth orders and adding the results gives the overall tempo-free total fertility rate: TFR’
= Σ TFR’o. The difference TFR’ – TFR equals the absolute tempo effect.
The tempo-adjusted TFR’ should be interpreted as a variant of the conventional
TFR. The conventional TFR is defined as the number of births women would have by
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the end of the childbearing years (i.e., the completed fertility) if the age-specific fertility
rates observed in a given year applied throughout the childbearing years. This is a hypothetical rate because no actual cohort will experience these observed period fertility
rates. The adjusted TFR’ is a similar hypothetical measure, but it differs because the
distortions caused by tempo changes during the year are removed. Neither the TFR nor
the TFR’ attempts to estimate the completed fertility of any actual birth cohort, nor do
they attempt any prediction of future fertility. The goal of the TFR’ is simply to remove
tempo distortions in observed total fertility rates.
The above tempo-adjustment formula (2) has been independently derived by
Kohler and Philipov (2001). They advance a more general equation, which incorporates
variance effects, but their formula reduces to equation (2) when the shape of the fertility
schedule is invariant.
Finally, to compare the theoretical and empirical analysis, we make use of the
fact that cohort fertility equals the tempo-adjusted period fertility when cohort and period fertility are constant (but not necessarily equal) and the mean age at childbearing at
each order changes by a constant amount each year (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). In
practice these conditions are not observed in any actual population, but during the 1980s
these conditions were observed approximately in many developed countries for births
of order 1. In that case the tempo effect at order 1 calculated by comparing the 1960
cohort with period fertility during the 1980s (as in Figures 2 and 6) should be the same
as the tempo effect calculated from equation (1) from the annual mean change in the age
at first birth during the 1980s. According to equation (1) the proportional tempo distortion of the average TFR1 during the 1980s equals minus m1 (MAC1 in 1980 minus MAC1
in 1990 divided by 10): the more rapid the rise in MAC1, the larger the downward tempo
distortion. This implies that in a plot of m1 versus the proportional tempo distortion
during the 1980s, countries should lie along a line going through the origin at a minus
45-degree angle. This expected model relationship is plotted in Figure 6 as the dashed
line. This line is very close to and statistically indistinguishable from the observed pattern plotted in Figure 6, indicating that in this set of countries the observed tempo effect
calculated as the difference between cohort and period fertility is well predicted by the
above model equation. In other words, the empirical and theoretical analyses of the
tempo effects are consistent with each other.
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Estimates of tempo-adjusted TFR
The tempo effects that so clearly affect the TFR1 also affect the TFR components
for higher birth orders. These tempo effects at higher orders can be larger or smaller than
those at order 1 depending on the annual changes in the mean ages at different orders. As
noted, the adjustment procedure for eliminating tempo effects is applied separately to
all orders, and summing these order-specific results then produces the adjusted TFR’.
Since the data required for the tempo adjustment were not available in the precise form
needed, an indirect procedure was used to calculate the mean ages of births of orders
above the first, as described in the Appendix. These results should be regarded as approximations. Estimation of the TFR’ with this procedure was possible in 19 countries
for the period 1980 to the late 1990s, with the latest available year varying slightly
among countries.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 3, which provides average
observed and tempo-adjusted TFRs for two periods, 1980–94 and 1990–ca.97. Results
for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom could not be included in this table because available statistics give births by order within current marriage rather than by
biological order for the mother as required for the application of the tempo-adjustment
procedure. The main finding in Table 3 is that the tempo effects (measured in births per
woman) in the last two columns are negative in the large majority of countries. This
implies that observed TFRs contain a downward distortion. As expected, the tempo
effects vary among countries, with the largest effects in the 1990s in Spain (–0.42), the
Czech Republic (–0.40), and Greece and Italy (–0.34). In contrast, in a few Eastern
European countries (not shown), the tempo effect was positive in the 1980s. In most countries the tempo effect is more negative in the early 1990s than in the 1980s (data not shown).
A comparison of the average tempo-adjusted total fertility rate for 1980–94 in
Table 3 and the completed fertility of the 1960 cohort in Table 1 reveals generally small
but significant differences in a number of countries. These differences are due to three
distinct factors: a) the approximate nature of the current estimates of TFR’ (owing to the
unavailability of published data needed for its calculation); b) violations of the assumptions on which the tempo-adjustment equation (2) are based; and c) variations in cohort
and period fertility over time. In other words, the TFR’ and the CFR would have been
equal if the data for the calculation of the TFR’ were available and accurate, if the as-
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Table 3 Estimates of observed and tempo-adjusted TFR and the tempo effect,
1980–94 and 1990–ca. 1997
Adjusted total
fertility rate

Total fertility rate
Austria
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
United States

1980–94
1.46
1.85
1.89
1.57
1.72
1.64
1.81
2.40
1.38
1.65
1.55
2.15
1.75
2.05
1.89
2.12
1.58
1.85
1.92

1990–ca.97
1.43
1.39
1.49
1.75
1.79
1.35
1.62
1.95
1.27
1.46
1.58
1.81
1.49
1.45
1.51
1.71
1.25
1.88
2.05

1980–94
1.64
1.89
2.01
1.86
1.84
1.89
1.95
2.67
1.70
1.85
1.85
2.16
1.99
2.11
1.83
2.15
1.95
2.05
2.06

1990–ca.97
1.62
1.56
1.89
2.03
1.94
1.69
1.88
2.26
1.62
1.63
1.83
2.06
1.82
1.63
1.56
2.04
1.68
2.16
2.21

Tempo effect
1980–94
–0.18
–0.04
–0.12
–0.30
–0.13
–0.25
–0.14
–0.27
–0.32
–0.20
–0.29
–0.01
–0.25
–0.07
0.07
–0.03
–0.37
–0.20
–0.14

1990–ca.97
–0.19
–0.17
–0.40
–0.28
–0.15
–0.34
–0.26
–0.31
–0.34
–0.17
–0.25
–0.25
–0.33
–0.17
–0.05
–0.32
–0.42
–0.28
–0.16

Notes: For discussion see text and Appendix. Data for Austria are available for 1984–98.
Sources: Council of Europe 2000; Sato 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998.

sumptions underlying equation (2) were not violated, and if cohort and period fertility
were constant. When only the first two of these conditions are valid, then the tempoadjusted TFR’ is not equal to the CFR, but the TFR’ gives an accurate estimate of the
total fertility rate that would be observed in the absence of changes in the timing of
childbearing. Of course, in reality, the assumptions on which equation (2) are based are
also not entirely valid, and estimates of TFR’ are therefore approximate.
Tempo and quantum of fertility
The implication of the preceding analysis is that observed total fertility rates are
determined by both the quantum and tempo of period fertility. The terms quantum and
tempo are used here to refer to components of the TFR observed during any given year
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as proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998). The quantum component is what the TFR
would have been without tempo effects, that is, the quantum equals the tempo-adjusted
TFR. The tempo component is the difference between the quantum component and the
observed TFR. This formulation of quantum and tempo is different from Ryder’s. In his
work, quantum refers to the completed fertility of cohorts, and tempo to the timing or
mean ages of births within these cohorts. In Ryder’s cohort-based formulation, quantum
and tempo are observable quantities, if only after the cohorts in question have completed their childbearing years. In the alternative formulation used here, the terms quantum and tempo have meaning and can be calculated only on the basis of a conceptualization
that introduces the tempo-adjusted TFR, a new indicator not used by Ryder.
Trends in period fertility are the net result of trends in tempo and quantum. There
are two situations in which an analysis of tempo effects is of special interest. The first is
in countries where the tempo effect is large. This is the case, for example, in Italy and
Spain during the 1990s as already discussed. In these two countries the effect is large
and negative, which implies that the observed TFR (1.27 and 1.25, respectively) is substantially lower than the undistorted rates of 1.62 and 1.68, respectively. The second
situation where an analysis of the tempo is important is in countries where the tempo
effect is changing rapidly. In such circumstances both the level and trend of the TFR can
give misleading impressions and tempo trends can mask underlying quantum trends. An
example of this occurred in the United States in the late 1980s. Between 1985 and 1990
the TFR rose from 1.84 to 2.07. However, this rise in the TFR was largely due to a
disappearance of the tempo effect, and the tempo-free TFR remained nearly constant
around 2.0 births per woman during this period (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). Another
example of a country with a clear downward trend in the tempo effect is the Netherlands
during the 1990s. As shown in Figure 7, the tempo effect was about 0.35 at the beginning of the 1990s, but it declined to about 0.10 in 1998. The TFR remained relatively
unchanged during most of this period, as the decline in the tempo effect offset a decline
in the tempo-free TFR. In the late 1990s the TFR turned up slightly and the reduction in
the tempo effect is apparently in part responsible for this upturn.
A rise in fertility has also been observed in 1999 in a number of other European
countries (Sardon 2001). Whether declines in tempo effects are responsible for or are
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Figure 7 Observed and tempo-adjusted TFR, Netherlands, 1990–98
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Note: For discussion see text and Appendix.
Source: Council of Europe 2000.

contributing to these slight upturns in fertility will remain unclear until additional data
become available.
I MPLICATIONS FOR F UTURE F ERTILITY
As in the past, future trends in the quantum and tempo of fertility will be driven
largely by socioeconomic developments. Most analysts attribute low and delayed fertility to the difficulties women in contemporary industrialized societies face in combining
childrearing with their education and a career, and to a rise in individualism and consumerism (Frejka and Calot 2001; Lesthaeghe 2001; McDonald 2000; van de Kaa 1987).
These recent trends in childbearing are part of a larger process of social and demographic change usually referred to as the second demographic transition. In addition to
declines in fertility, these new transitions are typically accompanied by widespread
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changes in attitudes and behaviors regarding sexuality, contraception, cohabitation,
marriage, divorce and extramarital childbearing (van de Kaa 1987). Lesthaeghe (2001)
identifies the following set of factors affecting childbearing behavior in post-transitional
societies:
(i) increased female education and female economic autonomy; (ii) rising and
high consumption aspirations that created a need for a second income in households and equally fostered female labour force participation; (iii) increased investments in career developments of both sexes, in tandem with increased competition in the workplace; (iv) rising “post-materialist” traits such as self
actualization, ethical autonomy, freedom of choice and tolerance for the nonconventional; (v) a greater stress on the quality of life with a rising taste for
leisure as well; (vi) a retreat from irreversible commitments and a desire for maintaining an “open future”; (vii) rising probabilities of separation and divorce, and
hence a more cautious “investment in identity.”
There is no agreement on which of these potential explanatory factors are most important in determining fertility trends—in part because, as Lesthaeghe (2001) aptly
notes, “we have more explanatory factors than observations.” In any case, explanations are likely to vary from society to society and even if past behavior could be
explained, the implications for future fertility trends would not necessarily be clear,
because many trends may have run their course.
Future tempo effects
Although existing theory is of little help in projecting future trends in the quantum of fertility, it is possible to make some general predictions about the tempo component. Tempo effects are by their nature temporary. They exist only as long as the mean
age at childbearing rises, disappearing when the change in the timing of childbearing
ends. This is true regardless of the level of the mean age. The tempo effect becomes zero
even if the mean age is high, provided the latter is constant.
The combined consequences of future changes in the quantum and tempo effects
can lead to a wide range of possible outcomes. Figure 8 presents two illustrative ex-
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amples. Both scenarios assume that the current TFR is deflated by a significant negative
tempo effect, and that this tempo effect will disappear at some unspecified point in the
future because the mean age at childbearing will stop rising. The scenario presented in
Figure 8a further assumes that the quantum remains constant at current levels. As a
consequence of these two trends the TFR will rise over time from its current level to
equal the quantum, that is, the adjusted TFR. An example of such a trend is the United
States in the late 1980s, as discussed earlier.
A second scenario is summarized in Figure 8b. In this case the quantum of fertility is assumed to continue to decline over time. The disappearance of the tempo effect
again puts upward pressure on fertility, but the rise in the TFR is not as large as in Figure
8a because there is an offsetting decline in the quantum. This scenario corresponds roughly
to trends observed in the Netherlands in the 1990s as summarized in Figure 7. Of course
if the future decline in the quantum is sufficiently rapid, then it is possible that no rise at all or
a decline would be observed in the TFR, despite the disappearance of the tempo effect.
A number of other scenarios could be envisioned, although the two presented in
Figure 8 are deemed most plausible. It is obviously not possible to predict trends in the

Figure 8 Fertility impact of future reductions in the tempo effect
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quantum and tempo components in any future year. However, since the mean age at
childbearing cannot rise forever, it must stabilize eventually. When that happens the
disappearance of the tempo effect will put upward pressure on the TFR. In fact, even a
slowdown in the pace of increase in the timing of childbearing reduces the size of the
tempo effect and this in turn exerts upward pressure on period fertility.
It is of interest that the scenario depicted in Figure 8 is consistent with the fertility
projections made by the United Nations. As noted, the UN has recently abandoned its
earlier assumption that all countries will eventually maintain fertility at the replacement
level. The latest projections incorporate complex assumptions about future trends in
fertility in countries with below-replacement fertility. The main assumption is that in the
long run countries will level off at the completed fertility rate of cohorts born in the
early 1960s, which implies TFRs in 2050 between 1.7 and 1.9 births per woman for
most low-fertility countries (United Nations 2001). As is clear from the earlier discussion, this assumption implies significant increases from current TFRs in the large majority of developed countries. The reasoning behind the UN’s assumption is not spelled out
in detail, but the implied disappearance of the tempo effects and resulting future trends
in the TFR are broadly similar to those shown in Figure 8.
C ONCLUSION
During much of the past half-century the attention of the scientific and policy
communities has focused on fertility declines, particularly in the developing world. By
the mid-1990s fertility transitions in most of these countries were well underway or
even nearing completion and these issues have therefore become somewhat less urgent.
Attention has increasingly turned to a relatively new and unexpected development, namely
the very low fertility observed in most post-transitional societies. The common past
view among demographers that fertility would level off at or near the replacement level
is now seen as ill-founded and indefensible (Demeny 1997). Replacement fertility has
become a theoretical threshold that has little or no meaning for individual couples building their families.
What happens next is far from clear. The future course of fertility in countries
where it is already at or below replacement is one of the most hotly debated issues in
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contemporary demography. There is no doubt that fertility in much of the developed
world has reached historic lows and will almost certainly remain below replacement in
the future. However, the present analysis has demonstrated that period fertility measures such as the TFR are temporarily depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing in most of these countries. This postponement effect has been present in many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the future. But once
this rise ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility-depressing effect stops,
thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. When the tempo effect becomes smaller
or disappears, the downward trend in period fertility could end, and a slight upturn is a
distinct possibility. Such a rise could occur even while the mean age at childbearing is
still rising, if the rate of increase is less steep than in the past. Additional upward pressure on period fertility would result if the obstacles that prevent women from achieving
their desired family sizes could be removed. Women on average want about two children in contemporary societies for which preference measures are available. Although
these preferences have been quite stable since the 1970s, there is, of course, no assurance that preferences will remain at current levels in the future. Moreover, removing
existing obstacles to preference implementation is difficult and expensive.
In an analysis of the most recent fertility trends in the European Union (EU),
Sardon (2001) concludes: “Fertility...increased in over half of the [EU] member states in
1999 (Netherlands, France, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, Spain, Greece,
Italy, Portugal) plus Norway and Switzerland.” This is a reversal of past trends even
though the increases are small. Furthermore, if the upward trend continues, future increases are likely to remain small. It is too early to tell why the reversal is happening and
whether it is a temporary phenomenon. In view of the analysis presented here this new
development is not a surprise; indeed one would expect an end or reversal of the downward trend in fertility sooner or later. The implication is that countries with very low
fertility and substantial tempo effects in the EU and elsewhere could well experience a
period of modest rises in fertility in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems highly unlikely that fertility will rebound
to the replacement level.
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A PPENDIX
Data for this study are primarily taken from Council of Europe (2000) and Sardon
(2000, 2001). These references provide annual statistics for the following variables in
many European countries:
TFR: Total fertility rate (all birth orders combined)
TFR1: Total fertility rate for births of order 1
MAC: mean age at childbearing (all orders combined)
MAC1: mean age at first birth
B: total number of births (all orders combined)
Bo: number of births of orders 1,2,3,4, and 5+ (o is birth order)
Because these sources do not include estimates of TFRo and MACo for birth orders above 1, the following indirect procedure was developed.
Estimates of the TFRo for orders above 1 were obtained from
TFRo= (TFR–TFR1) Bo/(B–B1).

(A1)

The mean ages at childbearing for birth orders higher than 1 were estimated as
MACo=MAC1+(o – 1)I,

(A2)

where I equals the interval between the mean ages at successive birth orders. I is assumed constant across birth orders but varies with time. The average age at childbearing
is a weighted average of the mean ages at each order:
MAC=(MAC1TFR1+(MAC1+I)TFR2+(MAC1+2I)TFR3
+(MAC1+3I)TFR4 +(MAC1+4I)TFR5)/TFR.

(A3)

Rearranging gives
I=TFR(MAC–MAC1)/(TFR2+2TFR3+3TFR4+4TFR5).

(A4)

Substitution of the order components of the TFR from (A1) in (A4) gives an
estimate of I that when substituted in (A2) gives estimates of MACo. Application of
equation (2) in the main text then produces estimates of the tempo-adjusted TFRo.
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Since direct estimates of TFRo and MACo were available for the Netherlands from
Eurostat (1997), it is possible to compare the above indirect procedure for estimating
TFR’ with the TFR’ obtained directly from TFRo and MACo for each year from 1980 to
1994. The average absolute error in the TFR’ during this 14-year period resulting from
the above indirect procedure was 0.008 births per woman. This small error suggests that
the proposed indirect procedure is sufficiently accurate for present purposes. In general
the procedure gives acceptable results in countries with very low fertility, but the accuracy declines as the proportion of fertility at birth orders 2+ rises. The procedure is not
recommended in populations for which direct estimates exist of TFRo and MACo for
several birth orders.
Notes
The author gratefully acknowledges comments on earlier drafts of this paper from
Brian Pence and financial support from USAID and the Hewlett and Mellon Foundations.
1

In this study the term developed world is used to refer to what the UN (2001)
calls the “More developed regions,” which comprise Europe, Northern America,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

2

Once the components CFRo are known, other order-specific measures can be calculated. For example, the parity progression ratio at parity o equals CFRo+1/CFRo and
the proportion of the cohort that has exactly o births equals CFRo+1–CFRo.

3

It is computationally straightforward to calculate total fertility for any specific
birth order. Instead of including births of all orders in the numerators of the agespecific fertility rates on which the TFR is based, only births of a single order are
included and the same denominators are used. The results of such a calculation
for each birth order o is a set of birth-order components TFRo that when summed
equal the TFR (TFR=Σ TFRo).

4

For first births the period 1980–89 is used for comparison with fertility of the
1960 cohort, because the large majority of first births occur when women are
between ages 20 and 30.
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5

The tempo effect in percent is calculated as T=100*(TFR1–CFR1)/CFR1. MAC1
is measured at the beginning of 1980 and of 1990 to obtain the change during the
1980s.

6

The central assumption is that the shape of the age schedule of fertility at each
birth order does not change during the period for which the TFR is measured.
That is, variations in these schedules are limited to multiplication by a constant
factor to move the level of period age-specific birth rates up or down and translation to lower or higher ages to change the timing of childbearing. This implies an
absence of cohort effects because the postponement or advancement of births
occurs uniformly over all ages within a period. For further discussion of this
tempo-adjustment procedure see Bongaarts and Feeney (2000), Kim and Schoen
(2000), and van Imhoff and Keilman (2000).
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